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        Higher education faces a unique challenge in the coming years as faculty 
who are members of the baby boom generation near retirement.  There will be 
one set of problems if the most senior faculty stay on too long and there will be a 
different set of problems if they all leave at once.  With the elimination of 
mandatory retirement in 1994, universities and colleges are concerned about the 
possibility that many faculty will remain on the job past age 70.  There are fears 
that this will have adverse consequences for teaching and research productivity 
and will lead to higher tuition to cover salaries and benefits.  At the same time 
there is concern on many campuses that the age distribution of faculty is so 
heavily skewed toward the 50-and-over range that universities will face shortages 
in many fields by the end of this decade.   
From a faculty perspective, there are serious challenges as well.  Some 
faculty work longer than they would prefer simply because they are not yet 
eligible for full pension and Social Security benefits.  The tenure system generally 
does not permit part-time work, making it difficult for older faculty to cut back on 
their work hours as they near retirement.  In the private sector, many older 
workers take bridge jobs as they transition from full-time work into retirement.  
Although some faculty members have good options off campus, those in many 
disciplines will have difficulty finding opportunities to apply the teaching and 
research skills valued in academe to other types of work.   
Phased retirement has been introduced on many campuses to help deal 
with these challenges.  Under most phased retirement plans, faculty members 
resign their full-time position (and often give up tenure) in return for the right to   2
work half-time at half-salary for a given number of years.  This paper examines 
how phased retirement creates value for both the university and the individual 
faculty member.  The analysis begins in Section I with a summary of the 
theoretical arguments about how phased retirement should be able to help both 
sides of the academic labor market.  The paper then turns to empirical evidence 
that sheds light on why universities and colleges offer phased retirement and why 
certain faculty accept it (and why others do not).   To obtain some insights into 
the motivation for phased retirement, Section II analyzes the odds that a college 
or university will have a phased retirement policy.  Are research universities more 
likely to offer phased retirement than four-year or two-year institutions?  Are the 
odds of offering phased retirement linked to the age distribution of faculty?  
Section III is a detailed case study of the experience of the University of North 
Carolina (UNC) system with phased retirement.  The discussion shows how 
many faculty opted for phased retirement, analyzes whether it accelerates or 
postpones full retirement, and summarizes evidence on its overall effectiveness 
from the perspectives of both faculty and management.  Section IV concludes by 
summarizing which of the theoretical sources of value have been most important 
in practice.   
 
I.  SOURCES OF VALUE 
 
Absent a phased retirement plan, tenured university professors have 
relatively few options for reducing their contracted work hours in the years before 
they retire.  The tenure system at most universities does not allow for part-time   3
work on campus.  Faculty can resign and contract to work for the university part-
time, but such contracts are usually for no more than one year and, in a world 
where non-tenure track instructors provide teaching services at low cost, the 
financial terms of such contracts are often  unattractive.  Faculty with the capacity 
to consult or do research for the private sector or government could have 
attractive part-time opportunities off campus, but such opportunities may be 
extremely limited in some academic disciplines.  Finally, even in today’s wired 
labor market, jobs off-campus usually do not pop up after a few mouse clicks – 
search and negotiation costs have to be factored into any decision about whether 
seeking a part-time position is worth the effort.   
Given these constraints, consider a phased retirement contract that allows 
a faculty member who has met certain age and years of service criteria to work 
half-time at half-salary.  The value of such a contract is readily apparent for 
faculty who have greater earnings potential on campus than off.  In purely 
financial terms, the promise to pay half a salary for part-time work is equivalent to 
an option to sell one’s labor back to the university at that price.  In the absence of 
phased retirement, faculty would have to either (1) negotiate on their own with 
department heads and deans when they retire to secure a commitment for part-
time work or (2) look for work off-campus.  To see the value of the phased 
retirement option, compare the hourly rate under each of these two choices to 
the hourly rate that faculty receive while working (which they also would receive 
under phased retirement).  The financial option created by phased retirement will 
have no economic value for faculty who expect that they can negotiate a better   4
deal on their own with either the university or an off-campus organization.  
However, if the hourly rate on campus dominates the other two alternatives, then 
phased retirement provides greater earnings potential for individual faculty 
members. 
In some situations, phased retirement will enable professors to earn more 
income while working fewer hours.  This happens whenever the sum of one-half 
of the academic salary and all pension income exceeds the regular academic 
salary (or equivalently, if pension income exceeds one-half the academic salary).  
The ability to make more money and work less will be highly tempting to many, 
but such a combination does not automatically predict movement into phased 
retirement.  When faculty near the age of eligibility for partial or full benefits under 
Social Security or a defined benefit pension, there is a tremendous incentive to 
work an extra year because annuity income increases considerably at those 
ages.  In such a situation, there is an economic logic behind working full-time one 
more year, even if it means less income and more work than phased retirement.   
Faculty covered by defined contribution pensions face considerable 
uncertainty about their pension income because the value of their pension hinges 
on outcomes in financial markets.  Someone who fears that the value of the 
assets in his or her retirement account are likely to decline could choose to retire 
in order to lock in an annuity on favorable terms.  Eligibility to receive pension 
income is generally tied to severance from the university.  Phased retirement 
allows faculty to start receiving pension income while continuing to work, thereby   5
allowing them to make their labor supply and annuity receipt decisions with a 
greater degree of independence.      
This discussion has emphasized financial benefits from phased 
retirement, but given the unique nature of academic labor markets, such a 
narrow focus would lead one to underestimate the true value of phased 
retirement for faculty.  Most tenured faculty in their 50s and 60s have spent 
virtually their entire life in school.  Phased retirement gives them extra time to 
collect information about retirement opportunities and potential bridge jobs 
outside academe before they exit the university.  The psychological benefits of 
phased retirement will likely be substantial in many cases -- faculty receive 
access to colleagues and academic resources, the opportunity to continue to 
contribute in the classroom and in research, and the ability to still call themselves 
members of the faculty.   
Even if phased retirement is a great deal for faculty, why should a 
university consider offering such a benefit?  Half pay for half work may sound like 
a wash at first, but phased retirees will expect to continue to receive employee 
benefits, especially health insurance, along with their half-salary.  So unless 
phased retirement can reduce labor costs along some other dimension or 
improve professor performance, one must question whether it has any value to 
universities. 
The first question university chancellors and presidents should ask is what 
happens to faculty retirement rates?  Phased retirement makes bridge jobs 
outside the university less attractive, leading faculty members seeking to reduce   6
work hours to stay with the university longer than they might have otherwise.  
However, it also creates an option for part-time work on campus where none 
previously existed, which will lead some faculty to enter phased retirement well 
before the time they would have fully retired.  The one unambiguous effect of 
phased retirement is that it accelerates the date at which faculty start to cut back 
on their commitments to the university.  It also is conceivable that under phased 
retirement they will stay on campus more years than they would have otherwise.  
For instance, a professor who might have fully retired at age 65 might choose to 
enter phased retirement at age 62 and work until age 67.  Economic theory 
cannot predict whether the introduction of a phased retirement program will 
accelerate or decelerate the rate at which faculty totally sever their ties to the 
university.  One would expect that faculty who have the option of phased 
retirement would start the retirement process earlier than those who do not have 
that option.   
The second big question university leaders should ask is how will a 
phased retirement program affect the productivity mix of the faculty?  The 
nightmare scenario is where top researchers use phased retirement as an 
opportunity to start a new business or an affiliation with another campus.  The 
preferred scenario is where phased retirement gives unproductive faculty who 
have become jaded with academe but who are not yet eligible for full pension 
benefits a chance to exit gracefully.  Phased retirement is most attractive to (1) 
faculty with the worst earnings opportunities off campus and (2) faculty who are 
least likely to be able to negotiate for themselves a satisfactory part-time salary   7
on campus after regular retirement.  Assuming a positive correlation between 
productivity on campus and either a negotiated part-time wage on campus or the 
best wage opportunity off campus, this would imply that unproductive faculty 
would be more likely to enter phased retirement than highly productive faculty.   
Given the manpower planning challenges facing university leaders that 
were noted in the introduction, phased retirement also will create value if it leads 
to improved personnel planning and economizes on adjustment costs associated 
with new hires and retirements.  Under a formal phased retirement program, 
professors announce their intention to leave typically between two to five years in 
advance, a much longer time horizon than would be involved under regular 
retirement.  This should improve succession planning and thereby reduce the 
odds of having unfilled positions or the likelihood of resorting to early retirement 
buyouts or layoffs.  If provosts and deans decide to use the half-salary saved by 
phased retirement on non-tenure track instructors, there is the possibility of 
simple cost reduction as well.
1  
 
II.  WHO OFFERS PHASED RETIREMENT AND WHY? 
The most comprehensive source of information about phased retirement 
plans in higher education is the Survey of Changes in Faculty Retirement 
Policies (SCFRP), conducted in 2000 by the American Association of University 
                                                  
1 Leslie and Janson (2004) offer a different perspective for the motivation of 
universities that offer phased retirement.  Based on a series of interviews at 
different campuses, they conclude that universities start phased retirement 
because it “humanizes employee relations.”   They conclude that most of the 
benefits from phased retirement accrue to the individual faculty member, 
whereas the benefits to the institution appear less certain.   
   8
Professors with financial support from the TIAA-CREF Institute.  The survey 
examined U.S. institutions of higher learning in all five Carnegie categories with 
75 or more full-time faculty members.  At the time of the survey, 27 percent of the 
responding institutions had a phased retirement program in place.
2  These 
programs had the following characteristics:   
•  Faculty in most programs (64 percent) must obtain administrative approval 
to participate.   
•  Most programs require faculty to reach minimum levels of age (75 
percent) and years of service (73 percent) to be eligible for phased 
retirement.  The modal age requirement is 55, but some programs are 
open to 50-year-olds whereas many others require participants to be at 
least 60.  Programs typically require 10 or more years of service to be 
eligible.   
•  A minority of programs (21 percent) put a ceiling on age of eligibility, in 
most cases 62 or higher. 
•  Roughly two-thirds of the programs provide special financial benefits.  In 
most cases the special benefit is full contribution to health insurance, 
although some institutions provide extra salary payments or extra 
retirement payments or credits. 
•  Most plans (60 percent) do not require professors to relinquish tenure 
before they enter phased retirement.  Faculty members generally must 
lose their tenured status after three or five years in phased retirement.   
                                                  
2 Ehrenberg (2003) summarizes the key features of the programs that were in 
place at that time.   9
One way to potentially better understand the motivation behind phased 
retirement plans is to compare the characteristics of universities which offer such 
plans to those which do not.  It is reasonable to expect that the value of phased 
retirement to the institution should be a function of its mission.  Doctoral 
institutions must be especially sensitive to the orderly replacement of aging 
faculty to be competitive for graduate students and research contracts.  
Presuming that phased retirement polices provide improved capacity to make 
long run plans for staffing, one would expect doctoral universities to be more 
likely to adopt such policies.  In contrast, universities and colleges that focus on 
teaching, especially baccalaureate and 2-year institutions, have more flexibility in 
how they replace aging faculty members and thus may not value phased 
retirement as much.  These patterns are borne out in the SCFRP data, as shown 
in Table 1.  Phased retirement programs are most commonly observed among 
doctoral universities (35 percent).  The percentage of masters and baccalaureate 
institutions with phased retirement plans is slightly lower (29 percent), whereas 
the percentage of two-year institutions is considerably lower (16 percent).   
The age and tenure structure of the faculty also should have some bearing 
on the value of phased retirement to the institution.  Colleges and universities 
with a high percentage of faculty who are near retirement have much more to 
gain from successfully managing the transition to retirement than those with 
relatively fewer faculty in their 50s and 60s.  There is no systematic relationship 
between the age structure of the faculty and the adoption of phased retirement 
policies across the campuses in the SCFRP sample (Table 1).  Phased   10
retirement policies are most prevalent among schools with 30 to 39 percent of 
faculty in the 55-and-over age bracket and least prevalent among schools with 
fewer than 30 percent of faculty in this age bracket, as expected.  However, 
phased retirement policies are least common among schools with 40 percent or 
more of faculty in this age bracket, which runs contrary to expectations.   
Holding age structure constant, tenure has an obviously large impact on 
the degrees of freedom the institution has available to manage an aging 
workforce.  Institutions with a high percentage of tenured faculty have much less 
flexibility than those with relatively low percentages of tenured faculty.  To the 
extent that tenured faculties are also highly compensated faculties, phased 
retirement plans also generate greater opportunities for cost savings.   
Empirically, there appears to be a strong relationship between the percentage of 
full-time faculty with tenure and the adoption of phased retirement policies.  Table 
1 shows that the percentage of schools with phased retirement steadily increases 
with the percentage of full-time faculty with tenure.  Phased retirement policies 
are in place at only 16.5 percent of the schools where less than 40 percent of the 
faculty have tenure.  In contrast, phased retirement is available at 25.3 percent of 
the schools where the tenure ratio is 40 to 49 percent, at 30.2 percent of the 
schools where the tenure ratio is 50 to 69 percent, and 33.7 percent of the 
schools where the tenure ratio is 70 percent or higher.   
The fit between a phased retirement plan and the pension plan must be 
assessed carefully.  Defined benefit plans are a poor fit with phased retirement 
for two reasons.  First, the pension payment under defined benefit plans is a   11
function of final average salary, which means that a move to a half-time job on 
campus is also a move to as much as a 50 percent cut in one’s pension (unless 
the retiree can start receiving the annuity upon entering phased retirement or a 
special exemption for phased retirees can be created in the benefit formula).  
Second, the formulas for most defined benefit plans are set up in such a way that 
the present value of the pension annuity is maximized at the time the individual 
becomes eligible for full retirement benefits.  The pension-based incentives 
facing these individuals for retirement are extremely powerful and are likely to 
reduce the value of retirement-management policies to the university.   Phased 
retirement plans are likely to be a better fit on campuses with defined contribution 
plans because they offer managers a mechanism to productively influence 
retirement decisions.  The data in Table 1 show a strong relationship between 
type of pension plan and the adoption of phased retirement plans.  Phased 
retirement is available at 38 percent of schools which exclusively have a defined 
contribution plan, versus 19 percent of schools which exclusively have a defined 
benefit plan.   
Private colleges and universities are likely to have more degrees of 
freedom to adopt phased retirement plans than their public counterparts.  Public 
colleges and universities tend to be less autonomous, facing some degree of 
oversight from state government.  In some states, public institutions are part of a 
statewide system, which would have mixed effects on the odds of adopting a 
phased retirement plan.  On the one hand, there would be greater transactions 
costs associated with adopting a new policy in a statewide system than a single   12
campus.  On the other hand, a successful launch of a statewide plan would lead 
to earlier adoption on campuses that left on their own would not have adopted a 
plan.  Further, private schools may have such an advantage in dealing one-on-
one with individual faculty about their compensation and workloads that they may 
have little need for a phased retirement policy.  In the SCFRP data in Table 1, 
there is very little difference in the odds of having a phased retirement plan 
between public and private institutions.
3   
The adoption of phased retirement policies is also likely to reflect the 
management style of the organization.  Institutions that have decided to take 
active steps to manage the age structure of their faculty are likely to consider a 
variety of steps, rather than focus on a single policy.  If true, one would expect 
campuses that have phased retirement policies to also have taken other steps, 
including seminars on retirement planning, financial incentives for early 
retirement, and targeted buyouts.  These patterns are born out in the SCFRP 
data, as shown in Table 1.  Phased retirement plans are available in 29.2 percent 
of the schools that offer retirement planning seminars or programs, in contrast to 
11.6 percent of schools that do not offer such programs.  Phased retirement 
policies are in place in 31.9 percent of the schools that offered financial 
incentives for retirement since 1995, versus 22.7 percent of the schools that did 
not offer such incentives.  Phased retirement is available at 32 percent of the 
schools that offered buyouts to faculty since 1995 (either on a college-by-college 
                                                  
3 Palmer, Flusche, and Johnson (2004) discuss the process through which a 
private university (Syracuse) adopted its phased retirement plan.     13
or case-by-case basis), in contrast to 24 percent of the schools that did not offer 
buyouts. 
The simple comparisons made in Table 1 could be misleading.  For 
instance, it is well known that the tenure ratio is much lower at baccalaureate and 
two-year schools than at doctoral and masters level institutions.  Probit analysis 
is a tool that can be used to control for additional variables.  It is very much like 
much like multiple regression analysis, except that is designed for situations 
where the dependent variable (odds of having a phased retirement program) is 
measured in binary categories (either you have a phased retirement plan or you 
do not have one).  Table 2 reports the results of a probit analysis of the odds that 
a campus will have a phased retirement plan, using the variables from Table 1 
along with number of full-time faculty.  The number of full-time faculty is included 
in the analysis to determine whether there are economies of scale involved with 
developing and implementing phased retirement plans.  If the costs of developing 
a phased retirement plan increase less rapidly with size than the benefits, one 
would expect that small schools would be less willing than large schools to adopt 
the plans.   
In the probit analysis, three variables stand out as significant predictors of 
the odds that a campus will have a phased retirement plan.  Institutions that 
exclusively offer a defined contribution plan have a 23 to 24 percentage point 
greater probability of offering phased retirement than schools that offer defined 
benefit plans.  This reflects both the poor fit between defined benefit plans and 
phased retirement policies as well as the possible use of phased retirement for   14
strategic human resource management on campuses that only offer defined 
contribution plans.
4   
Schools with a large percentage of tenured faculty are much more likely to 
have phased retirement plans than schools with a relatively small percentage of 
tenured faculty.  At the extreme, a school where all faculty have tenure would 
have a 38 to 40 percent greater chance of having a phased retirement plan than 
a school where none have tenure.  Percentage of faculty with tenure is strongly 
correlated with Carnegie categorization, so the analysis was repeated by 
estimating separate probit models for each Carnegie class (these results are not 
reported in Table 2; they are available from the author upon request).  The 
decrease in sample size makes these results more fragile, but percentage 
tenured was still statistically significant at or near the p=0.10 threshold in all 
levels of institutions except two-year institutions without faculty ranks.  Note that 
whereas there is a significant relationship between the odds of offering phased 
retirement and percentage of faculty with tenure, there is no relationship between 
the odds of offering phased retirement and Carnegie class once one controls for 
percentage of faculty with tenure.
5   
Phased retirement plans are much more likely to be in place on campuses 
which followed a management strategy of actively managing faculty retirement.  
                                                  
4 Pencavel (2004) finds the same thing.  His model differs in that phased 
retirement and other retirement policies are jointly determined, which leads him 
to use a different set of control variables.   
5 This can be easily explained by the strong correlation between Carnegie class 
and the tenure ratio.  In Carnegie I institutions, if one takes simple unweighted 
averages across schools, 64 percent of faculty have tenure in the average 
school.  This falls off to 54 percent in IIA, 46 percent in IIB, 45 percent in III, and 
32 percent in IV.      15
Schools that have offered retirement planning seminars are 12 percent more 
likely to have phased retirement plans than schools that have not offered such 
seminars.  Schools that have offered financial incentives for retirement before 
age 70 are 10 percent more likely to have phased retirement plans than schools 
that have not offered such incentives.  There is no significant relationship 
between buyouts by college or individual and the odds of having a phased 
retirement plan.  Public institutions have a 10 percentage point greater probability 
of having a phased retirement plan than private institutions.  This effect is 
statistically significant at the 6 to 10 percent level, a bit below the standard 
threshold used in social science.   
There was no evidence in the probit analysis of economies of scale in the 
offering of phased retirement plans.  There also was no relationship between the 
age structure of the faculty and the odds of having a phased retirement plan.  
This conclusion was robust across a number of other measures of age structure 
(e.g., percentage above 60, percentage below 50).   
To sum up, this discussion shows that phased retirement plans have not 
been cropping up on a random basis.  There is clear evidence that campus 
leaders have carefully considered preexisting conditions such as type of 
retirement plan and the percentage of the faculty with tenure.  The fact that 
campuses with a high percentage of faculty members with tenure are most likely 
to have phased retirement plans (as well as retirement planning seminars and 
offers of financial incentives for retirement)
6 implies that phased retirement is 
                                                  
6 The percentage of faculty with tenure is 51.5 percent at schools with retirement 
planning workshops, versus 43.5 percent at schools without such workshops.    16
being viewed as a tool to give management more flexibility to manage a difficult-
to-manage workforce.   
 
III.  PHASED RETIREMENT IN THE UNC SYSTEM 
The percentage of faculty in the UNC system who are age 50 or higher 
has increased considerably in the 1980s and 1990s, following national trends.
7  
In 1996 UNC President C.D. Spangler appointed a committee to study the 
possible need for early retirement programs.  Because the university system was 
predicted to add 40,000 students in the first decade of the 2000s, the committee 
concluded that there was no need for an early-retirement program designed to 
reduce the number of faculty members above a given age threshold.  Instead, 
they recommended that the UNC system consider a phased retirement program 
that would moderate the aging of the faculty without increasing costs.   
The Board of Governors of the UNC system approved a five-year trial 
program in 1998 that permitted half-time work for half the final academic salary.  
No special payments or subsidies were provided for selection into the program.  
The purpose of the program was “to promote renewal of the professoriate in 
order to ensure institutional vitality and to provide additional flexibility and support 
for individual faculty members who are nearing retirement” (UNC Policy Manual, 
300.7.2.1 [G]).  The program had three major goals: 
1.  Better personnel planning – institutions will be able to better anticipate 
position openings and make replacement plans  
                                                                                                                                                
The tenure ratio is 52.6 percent on campuses that have offered financial 
incentives, versus 48.2 percent on schools that have not offered such incentives. 
7 This discussion borrows heavily from Ghent, Allen, and Clark (2001).   17
2.  Enhanced recruitment and retention – an additional benefit to faculty 
should help in this regard 
3.  Increased quality of faculty – institutions will be able to fill faculty positions 
while retaining the skills and knowledge of experienced faculty  
Each of the 15 campuses in the UNC system that grant tenure was 
required to implement a phased retirement program.
8  To be eligible for the 
program, faculty must be tenured.  When the program was launched, faculty also 
had to be age 50 with 20 years of service or age 60 with 5 years of service at the 
same institution.  The criteria are now 50 years of age with 5 years of service at 
the current institution.  Each campus was allowed to select the length of the 
contract for its faculty; however, the program required a minimum length of one 
year and a maximum length of five years.  Twelve of the 15 institutions chose a 
three-year phased retirement contract, two institutions chose a two-year contract, 
and one campus chose a five-year phased retirement contract.  Although 
launched as a five-year pilot, the program is now permanently in place. 
Individuals considering entering the program negotiate their half-time 
duties with their department chairs prior to accepting phased retirement.  Duties 
could be performed evenly across both semesters or the individual could work 
full-time one semester and have no specific assigned duties the next semester.  
They may elect to start receiving pension benefits after entering phased 
retirement.  If they begin their retirement benefits, they are eligible for the same 
health insurance as active employees.  Since 1971, newly hired faculty in the 
                                                  
8 The NC School of the Arts is also a member of the UNC system, but it does not 
award tenure. 
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UNC system had the ability to choose between the defined benefit plan designed 
for teachers and state employees or a variety of defined contribution plans.  
Faculty hired in earlier years are covered by the defined benefit plan. 
Robert Clark, Linda Ghent and I have studied the phased retirement plan 
of the UNC system using the annual faculty censuses that each campus submits 
to the Office of the President.  These are the employment records for all faculty 
employed as of September of the specified year.  Information on each person 
includes age, hire date, rank, gender, race, tenure status, annual salary, and type 
of pension plan.  The annual records are linked across years so we are able to 
determine whether an individual remains in his or her faculty position from one 
year to the next.  The census data for the years 1994 until 2003 are employed in 
this study.  The analysis is limited to faculty members who were eligible to enter 
the phased retirement program.  This paper briefly summarizes the key findings 
of our earlier papers and then reports new evidence on the experience faculty 
and department heads have had with phased retirement.   
In the three years prior to the introduction of phased retirement, the 
retirement rate from UNC institutions among eligible faculty age 50 averaged 8.7 
percent (see Table 3).  After the introduction of the new retirement program, the 
total retirement rate (full retirement plus phased retirement) increased to 10.4 
percent in 1997-98, 11.3 percent in 1998-99, and 10.4 percent in 1999-2000
9.  
The percentage of faculty selecting phased retirement was 3.2 in 1997-98, 2.3 in 
1998-99, and 3.0 in 1999-2000.  The full retirement rates were 7.2 percent in 
                                                  
9 The retirement rates represent the percentage of eligible faculty in census year 
t who were retired in census year t+1.     19
1997-98, 9.0 percent in 1998-99, and 7.4 percent in 1999-2000.  During these 
years, phased retirees represented between 20 and 31 percent of all retirements 
from the UNC system.  In absolute numbers, about 70 faculty entered the phased 
retirement program each year while around 225 fully retired.   
The percentage of faculty entering full and phased retirement began to 
decline in 2000-01, which is the same time that the stock market began to drop.  
From 1999-2000 to 2002-03 the full retirement rate had fallen by more than half 
to 3.3 percent.  Over the same period, the phased retirement rate had fallen by a 
third to 2.0 percent.  In the 2000s, phased retirement accounted for 35 percent of 
total retirement.  In absolute numbers, 71 faculty entered the phased retirement 
each year in the 2000s while 130 fully retired.   
Table 4 shows how phased and full retirement rates vary by age in the 
1990s.  In most years, the full retirement rate increases steadily with age, a 
pattern consistent with previous research.  A similar pattern holds for phased 
retirement in 1997-98, with more faculty age 70 and over selecting phased 
retirement than full retirement.  In 1998-99 and 1999-2000, the phased retirement 
rate rises with age through the early to mid-60s, but then declines.  In all 
likelihood the very large response of the 70 and over group in 1997-98 reflects a 
constrained demand for phased retirement at the time it was implemented.    
Ghent, Allen, and Clark (2001) and Allen, Clark, and Ghent (2003) 
conducted an analysis of how those entering phased retirement differed from 
those who continued working full-time and those who entered full retirement.    20
The following are the key findings of those two studies regarding the 
characteristics of those most likely to enter phased retirement: 
•  Those entering phased retirement were much more likely to be 
employed at masters and baccalaureate universities than at doctoral 
universities.  This may reflect differences in teaching loads and a 
tendency to focus on teaching loads in negotiating duties under 
phased retirement.  Faculty who teach eight courses a year can buy a 
lot more free time by going half-time than faculty who teach four 
courses a year.  It is also possible that faculty on the doctoral 
campuses (NC State and UNC-Chapel Hill) have more opportunities 
for bridge jobs off campus. 
•  Faculty who are covered by the defined benefit plan are much more 
likely to enter phased retirement than those who selected defined 
contribution plans.  This likely reflects the strong incentives to retire at 
the age of eligibility for full pension benefits, and may be influenced by 
Social Security as well.  Reduced earnings during phased retirement 
do not adversely affect retirement benefits for faculty who elected the 
defined benefit plan.  
•  The odds of entering phased retirement by age map closely to the 
odds of entering full retirement by age; in both cases, there is are 
significant upswings in retirement odds at ages 62 and 65.   
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Faculty perspectives 
  Why do faculty enter phased retirement?  The Office of the President of 
the UNC system conducted surveys of faculty in phased retirement in 1998 and 
2003 to address this question.  The reason given by most faculty (60 percent in 
the 1998 survey and 69 percent in the 2003 survey) is that they wanted to 
“gradually transition into retirement.”  Very few planned to “pursue other 
employment” (6 percent in 1998 and 1 percent in 2003), whereas a modest share 
planned to “pursue other interests” (18 percent in 1998 and 9 percent in 2003).  
The remainder cited other factors, including health, changing university policies 
(including post-tenure review), and inability to afford full retirement. 
  More insight can be obtained when one looks at how faculty entering 
phased retirement changed their allocation of time to university and other 
activities.  Table 5 summarizes how faculty changed their on-campus workloads 
after entering phased retirement.  The average number of courses taught per 
year dropped by 44 percent from 4.3 to 2.4.  In most individual cases, faculty 
loads dropped by exactly 50 percent, but a few faculty had equal or even greater 
teaching loads, either because they were leaving administrative posts or because 
they cut back on time for research and service.  Most faculty (60 percent) worked 
at the university both academic semesters.   
  Going beyond teaching, the biggest change in time allocation on campus 
involved a significant cutback on administrative activities.  Among the 2003 
phased retirees who responded to the survey, 32 percent had an administrative 
appointment.  Across the entire sample, time allocated to administration fell from   22
24 percent on a full-time basis before phased retirement to 10 percent on a part-
time basis after phased retirement.  Faculty spent about the same percentage of 
their time on public service and extension activities before and after entering 
phased retirement.  There was a slight increase in the percentage of time 
allocated to research, but total time allocated to research dropped significantly 
(28 percent of time on a full-time basis to 30 percent of time on a part-time 
basis).   
  With their on-campus workload reduced by 50 percent, how do faculty 
reallocate their time?  Roughly two-thirds of the sample (67.7 percent) report 
spending more time in activities with friends, family, and community.  A 
substantial share (42.7 percent) report spending more time “engaged in research 
or other creative or scholarly activities,” spending 16.9 hours per week on such 
activities.  Exactly one-third of the sample report spending more time on 
volunteer activities and family assistance, spending 7 hours a week.  Only 22 
percent report spending more time working for pay away off-campus (including 
self-employment) and these individuals spend 11.5 hours per week working.  
Phased retirees also spent more time on civic activities, taking classes, travel, 
and health care. 
  Faculty almost always begin receiving pension benefits upon entering 
phased retirement.  In the 1998 survey, all faculty entering phased retirement 
started receiving benefits, whereas in 2003, 90.5 percent started receiving 
benefits.  The decision to start receiving Social Security as well largely depends 
on age.  In the 2003 survey, 42 percent started receiving Social Security and   23
those individuals were considerably older (68.7 years) than those who postponed 
Social Security or were ineligible (62.4 years).   
  In the 2003 survey, faculty were asked to estimate what percentage of 
their earnings in their last year of university employment was replaced by 
pension benefits (excluding Social Security).  There was no small amount of 
noise in the responses, including a value of zero for a person who claimed to be 
in the defined benefit pension plan with 30 or more years of service.  The raw 
mean response was a replacement rate of 39.2 percent.  If one trims all cases 
from the sample where the estimated percentage was below five (almost all of 
which claim 25 years or more of service), the mean replacement rate becomes 
46.0 percent.   
  Faculty in phased retirement came fairly close to maintaining their total 
level of income.  For the average respondent in the 2003 survey, combined 
income from pensions, Social Security, and phased retirement equaled 90 
percent of university earnings before entering phased retirement.  Almost half (42 
of 86 respondents) reported that they had replaced 100 percent or more of their 
income.  The overwhelming majority (95 percent) said that their combined 
income was about what they expected before entering phased retirement.   
  With nearly the same income and a 50 percent reduction in work hours, 
one would expect most faculty entering phased retirement to be very satisfied 
with the arrangement.  In 1998, 80 percent said they were pleased with phased 
retirement, 17 percent said they were somewhat pleased, and 3 percent said 
they were not pleased.     24
In 2003, 60 percent strongly agreed that they were “pleased with my participation 
in the Phased Retirement Program and would make the same decision again,” 
33 percent agreed, 6 percent disagreed, and 1 percent strongly disagreed.  In 
1998, 89.7 percent said they would recommend the phased retirement program 
to their colleagues.  In 2003, 59 percent strongly agreed that they “would 
recommend the Phased Retirement Program to my colleagues,” 30 percent 
agreed, 6 percent disagreed, and 5 percent strongly disagreed. 
  Despite high overall levels of satisfaction, some areas of contention were 
revealed in the 2003 survey.  One set of comments focused on the loss of on-
campus amenities, including a private office, access to parking, and ability to 
teach summer school.  Others reflected a desire to continue in phased retirement 
over a longer time period (usually five years instead of three).  Issues concerning 
health care coverage (including a plan that enabled employees to use pretax 
income to pay for healthcare) were raised by about 10 percent of the sample.   
Lastly, a few individuals seemed to have problems adjusting to a world in which 
they were no longer full-time faculty, as reflected by comments such as “It's the 
same thing as committing suicide” and “You will be taken advantage of 
constantly and consistently.” 
  Faculty currently working in the UNC system that are age 50 or above 
have a strong interest in pursuing phased retirement in the future.  In a separate 
survey conducted in fall 2003, 36 percent of those responding said that they 
planned to enter phased retirement.  This matches almost exactly with the ratio   25
of retiring faculty who entered phased retirement (as opposed to full retirement) 
so far in the 2000s.   
Managerial perspective 
  The most basic question for top management in academe is whether 
phased retirement makes faculty leave earlier or stay longer.   Table 3 showed 
an increase in the rate at which faculty left full-time employment after the 
introduction of phased retirement.  With 2.8 percent of faculty entering phased 
retirement and a decline in the full retirement rate of 0.8 percent in the 1990s, 
one might reasonably infer that most of the people entering phased retirement 
would have continued working if the option had not been available.  Ghent, Allen, 
and Clark (2001) examined this issue more rigorously using a probit analysis of 
data for the two years before and after the introduction of phased retirement.  
They rejected the hypothesis that there was a stable model that could explain 
both forms of retirement over this four-year period.  In other words, the 
characteristics that predict entry into full retirement in 1995-97 do not predict 
entry into full and phased retirement in 1997-99.  Ghent et al could not reject the 
hypothesis that there was a stable model of full retirement over the same period.  
Equivalently, the characteristics that predict entry into full retirement in 1995-97 
predict entry into full retirement equally well in 1997-99.  These results imply that 
phased retirees more closely resemble full-time workers than fully retired 
individuals.   
  With the 2003 survey of phased retirees, a more straightforward approach 
can be employed – simply ask the phased retirees what they would have done if   26
the plan had not been available.  When asked if they had not chosen to enter 
phased retirement, the overwhelming majority (84 percent) said they would have 
continued to work full-time.  Phased retirees say they would have worked an 
average of 3.6 more years if the program had not been available.  On campuses 
where the phased retirement contract lasts three years, phased retirees say they 
would have worked full-time for 3.5 more years, versus 4.2 more years of full-
time work on campuses where phased retirement contracts are five years.   
  One further consideration from a management standpoint is that not all 
phased retirees work part-time for the maximum time allowed.  In the 2003 
survey, 11 percent say they intend to fully retire before the end of their contract.  
Data on the actual duration of phased retirements are not available at this time. 
Looking across all the evidence assembled, it is quite clear that phased 
retirement leads faculty to cut back on their workload well before the time they 
would have fully retired.  To determine whether this is beneficial to the university, 
one must consider how this decreased contribution by senior faculty affects 
productivity and cost.   
Allen, Clark, and Ghent (2003) explored the productivity issue by 
examining how two different measures of productivity were related to the relative 
odds of full retirement, phased retirement and continued full-time work.  The first 
measure is the average pay increase received in the three previous years.  This 
is the most logical proxy measure for performance in the late 1990s because 
faculty pay raises were based entirely on merit during that period.  The other 
measure is academic rank.  Among tenured faculty in a relatively senior age and   27
tenure bracket, full professors have been judged by their peers, department 
heads, and deans as more productive than associate or assistant professors.   
The introduction of phased retirement increased the rate at which low 
performing faculty separated from the university.  Consider two otherwise 
identical professors, one who received an average pay raise of eight percent and 
one who received an average pay raise of zero (the mean pay raise was 4 
percent with a standard deviation of 4 percent, so this is not an unreasonable 
spread in the last half of the 1990s).  Before phased retirement was introduced, 
there was a 6.0 percent chance that a professor receiving eight percent raises 
would retire.  After the launch of phased retirement, the odds changed to a 5.9 
percent chance of full retirement and a 1.7 percent chance of phased retirement, 
for a combined increase in retirement odds of 1.6 percent.  Compare this to the 
case of a professor receiving no raises.  Before phased retirement was available, 
this professor had a 12.0 percent chance of full retirement.  After phased 
retirement the full retirement odds increased to 10.3 percent and the phased 
retirement odds were 4.3 percent, an overall retirement rate of 14.6 percent, an 
increase of 2.6 percent.  Retirement probabilities went up for both, but they went 
up more for the least productive professors.  There was a similar pattern in the 
change of retirement odds for full, associate and assistant professors.   
The response of faculty to the introduction of phased retirement varied 
with the mission of the institution.  Phased retirement generated a much greater 
response on campuses where the main mission is teaching than where the 
mission also included research.  Allen, Clark, and Ghent (2003) found, controlling   28
for other factors, a phased retirement rate of 1.6 percent on the two Research I 
campuses.  This is much higher than the rates elsewhere: 4.0 percent on 
doctoral campuses, 3.9 percent on masters campuses and 3.2 percent on 
baccalaureate campuses.  This likely reflects the fact that phased retirement 
provides a greater increase in free time on campuses with heavy teaching loads.  
Full retirement rates also are lower in research-oriented than teaching-oriented 
campuses, possibly reflecting the greater concentration of PhDs who need to 
work additional years to fully leverage their investment in human capital. 
What impact does phased retirement have on an academic department?  
So far the analysis points to earlier exits of faculty who are past their prime.  But 
at the micro level of an academic school, college, or department, the full answer 
depends upon how many faculty elect to enter phased retirement, how much of 
their salary line gets returned to the unit, and how difficult these faculty are to 
replace.  With only two to three percent of eligible faculty electing to enter phased 
retirement in any year, most units are likely to have no more than one or two 
persons on phased retirement at any point in time.  When only one person in the 
unit enters phased retirement, the savings of half a salary generally is not 
enough to fund a new position -- and of course there is no guarantee that the 
salary savings will be returned to the unit.  Looking across a school or college, 
deans have the opportunity to fund new hires in some departments, creating the 
opportunity for growth and renewal.    
Even when funds are returned to the department, close substitutes for the 
services provided by tenured faculty are not always readily available.  Some   29
campuses are located far away from metropolitan areas and have relatively few 
options for adjunct or part-time faculty.  Substitutes are more likely to be 
available for faculty teaching courses taken by freshmen and sophomores than 
for courses taken by upperclassmen and graduate students.  Adjunct faculty can 
help on the teaching dimension, but are unlikely to contribute to research and 
departmental service.  The faculty survey indicated that time allocated to 
research declined by half.  Time allocated to departmental service was not 
directly addressed in the faculty survey, but it is difficult to imagine that faculty in 
phased retirement would play as active a role as when they were working full-
time.  Presuming the service workload stays the same for the department, this 
means more work for everyone else.   
To address these issues, the Office of the President of the University of 
North Carolina system conducted a survey of deans and department heads in the 
1999-2000 academic year to learn about the impact of the phased retirement 
plan on each campus.  The number of responses relative to the number of 
colleges and departments varied significantly across each campus, ranging from 
two at UNC-Charlotte to 42 at East Carolina University.  At the two largest 
campuses (which have the most academic programs and departments), there 
were only ten responses at UNC-Chapel Hill and 38 at NC State.  Because of 
this variation in responses across campuses, the survey results do a better job of 
highlighting issues than of measuring impact.   
A total of 231 departments and colleges responded to the survey, of which 
107 departments or colleges reported that faculty from their unit had entered   30
phased retirement.  Across all campuses, 57 percent of the deans and 
department heads who had phased retirees reported that some of the salary 
savings were made available to their unit.  This percentage varied widely across 
campuses, ranging between 21 and 100 percent.  In units which lost a faculty 
member and failed to gain any resources, the department head or dean tended 
to have an unfavorable view of phased retirement.  The issue that came up most 
frequently (mentioned on 26 responses) was the loss of resources for the 
collective work of the department, especially service on committees and advising 
graduate students.  Changes in teaching assignments, larger classes, class 
cancellations, and greater use of non-tenure track faculty were also cited in the 
responses.  The allocation of office space was another contentious issue (cited in 
35 responses), as anyone in academic administration would expect.   
Improved personnel planning is a major goal of the UNC system’s phased 
retirement plan.  When the survey asked the department heads and deans if “you 
believe PRP provides an additional management tool for planning,” 59 percent 
responded affirmatively.  Although this is quite close to the 57 percent who 
received released salary funds, there was no direct relationship across 
campuses between the answers to this question and to the odds of receiving 
salary release funding.  Some department heads gave open-ended explanations 
for their response.  Most of the comments were favorable and tended to note two 
key benefits from phased retirement: (1) it provides the department with more 
time to develop a hiring strategy (cited 41 times) and (2) released salary funds 
give the department head more degrees of freedom to meet staffing needs (cited   31
19 times).  In nine cases, the respondents said that phased retirement 
encourages earlier retirement of less productive faculty.  The unfavorable 
comment that came up most frequently was that phased retirement made 
planning more difficult by imposing constraints upon resources and creating 
uncertainty about when the position will be fully replaced.  Such comments were 
most frequently made when the unit did not receive any released salary funding.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined the value created by phased retirement plans for 
both faculty members and the university that employs them.  From the point of 
view of faculty, there are two payoffs from having access to a phased retirement 
program: (1) greater opportunities for part-time work on campus, including in 
many cases the capacity to earn more income while working fewer hours, and (2) 
the ability to make the transition to a new stage of life more gradually than 
permitted by the tenure system.  Over the period of this study, phased retirees 
accounted for between 25 and 35 percent of all retirements, indicating that many 
faculty appreciate having more degrees of freedom in transitioning toward 
retirement.  In the UNC system, the take-up rates for phased retirement were 
significantly higher on campuses with the heaviest teaching loads, reflecting the 
fact that phased retirement buys more free time in those situations.   
From the perspective of the university, the biggest payoff from adopting a 
phased retirement plan is the increased odds that low performing faculty will start 
the retirement process earlier.  The precise payoff depends on how these   32
individuals are replaced, but there is the opportunity for both cost savings and 
intellectual renewal.  Cost savings arise from either pocketing the salary release 
or from replacing senior faculty with junior faculty or adjuncts.  Given the 
conditions of excess supply prevailing in most academic labor markets, 
particularly among junior faculty, universities should expect to eventually fill these 
positions with highly capable new faculty.   
According to a survey of deans and department heads, phased retirement 
is a useful tool for planning and management.  Universities that have introduced 
phased retirement have carefully assessed the fit between this new policy and 
their current situation.  Schools are much more likely to launch a phased 
retirement plan if they have a high percentage of tenured faculty, implying that 
the value of an additional management tool is greater in such a situation.  
Campuses with defined contribution plans are more likely to have phased 
retirement plans than those with defined benefit plans, which is what one would 
expect given the difficulties that come up with phased retirement under a defined 
benefit plan.  However, in the case study of the UNC system, employees who 
had chosen to be covered by the defined benefit pension plan had much greater 
odds of entering phased retirement than those who had selected a defined 
benefit plan.  Campuses with defined benefit plans would thus do well to develop 
some way to overcome the built-in conflicts between benefit formulas and the 
incentives for entering phased retirement, perhaps following the example of the 
UNC system.  The main challenges associated with the introduction of phased   33
retirement have been at the college or departmental level where administrators 
must scramble to find substitutes until the phased retiree becomes fully retired.   
This study has shown that a phased retirement program encourages 
faculty to start the transition to full retirement earlier than they would have in the 
absence of such a program.  More years of data from the UNC system will be 
needed to assess whether phased retirees end up entering full retirement sooner 
or later than they would have otherwise.  The survey data of faculty in phased 
retirement suggest that they enter full retirement earlier, but the answer to this 
question can be more rigorously ascertained with data on employment patterns 
before and after the introduction of phased retirement, including whether those 
entering phased retirement stay for the maximum time permitted.   
It would be helpful to learn how phased retirement rates vary by academic 
discipline.  Accelerated exit rates from academe can be better tolerated in 
disciplines with an excess supply of faculty than in those where new faculty are 
relatively scarce.  The organizational structure of the various universities in the 
UNC system varied so much that it was impossible to explore this issue over all 
15 campuses, but it would be feasible to conduct within-campus studies at some 
of the largest universities.   34
Table 1.  Percentage of colleges and universities with phased retirement plans, 
by institutional characteristics 
 
Sample mean   27.0
   
Carnegie class   
  Doctoral  35.0
  Masters  28.8
  Baccalaureate  28.9
  Two year with faculty ranks  14.1
  Two year without faculty ranks    18.2
   
Percentage of full-time faculty age 55 and over   
  Less than 30  27.6
  30 to 39.9  32.2
  40 or more  22.9
   
Percentage of full-time faculty with tenure   
  Less than 40  16.5
  40 to 49.9  25.4
  50 to 69.9  30.2
  70 or above  33.7
   
Retirement plan   
  Defined contribution only  38.2
  Defined benefit only  19.4
  Both combined  17.4
  Both alternatives  19.3
   
Public-private status   
  Public institution  26.7
  Private institution  27.3
   
Other retirement policies   
  Seminars on retirement planning available  29.2
  Seminars on retirement planning not available  11.6
   
  Financial incentives to retire before age 70 offered since 1995  31.9
  Financial incentives to retire before age 70 not offered since 1995  22.7
   
  Buyouts on college-by-college or individual basis offered since 1995  31.6
  Buyouts on college-by-college or individual basis not offered since 1995  24.2
 
Source: Survey of Changes in Faculty Retirement Policies  35
Table 2.  Probit analysis of odds that a campus will have a phased retirement 
program 
 
  Model without retirement
policy variables 
Model with retirement 
policy variables 


















































Financial incentives to retire  
before age 70 offered 
 0.104* 
(0.045) 




Note: Table reports change in probability that campus will have a phased 
retirement plan associated with a change in the independent variable from 0 to 1 
(except for line 1 which indicates the change in the odds of having a phased 
retirement plan resulting from an increase in faculty size of 1000).  Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses.   
* indicates statistically significant at p=0.05 level or greater 
** indicates statistically significant at p=0.01 level or greater 
 
Source: Survey of Changes in Faculty Retirement Policies 
 
   36
Table 3.  Retirement rates for University of North Carolina system faculty, by year 
 
 









1994-95 n.a.  8.7  8.7 
1995-96 n.a.  8.7  8.7 
1996-97 n.a.  8.8  8.8 
1997-98 3.2  7.2 10.4 
1998-99 2.3  9.0 11.3 
1999-2000 3.0  7.4  10.4 
2000-01 2.8  4.5  7.3 
2001-02 1.7  4.1  5.8 
2002-03 2.0  3.3  5.3 
 
 
Source: UNC system annual faculty censuses, 1994-2003 
 
Note: these retirement rates represent the percentage of faculty eligible for 
phased retirement who elected to either (1) enter phased retirement or (2) resign 


































50-57  2.7 2.7 2.7 3.2 2.3  1.0 4.3  3.6 0.7 4.7  3.8 0.9 
58-62  9.2 6.8 9.9 13.5 8.5  4.9 12.7  9.5 3.2 10.9  7.2 3.7 
63-64  18.3 24.7 18.6 19.7 14.7  5.0 20.5  17.2 3.3 25.3  17.5 7.8 
65  19.5 22.1 21.7 27.3 22.1  5.2  28.8 18.6  10.2  16.3 11.6  4.7 
66-69  29.2 30.0 22.9 21.2 17.2  4.0 27.7  23.7 4.0 20.0  14.8 5.2 
70+  41.7 12.0 30.8 29.5 13.6  15.9 35.0  30.0 5.0  17.0  10.6 6.4 




Source: UNC system annual faculty censuses, 1994-2000 
 
 Table 5.  Faculty workload on campus, before and after entering phased 
retirement 
 








    
Mean percentage of time allocated




















Source: Survey of UNC Phased Retirement Program Participants. 
 
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
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